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Huntington noted that "In 1974 eight of ten South American countries had nondemocratic governments."
2 By 1990 the opposite was true; all had democratic governments except for Paraguay. 3 Many academics and U.S. foreign policy experts exultantly proclaimed political success in the Americas. Francis Fukuyama even went as far as proclaiming the supremacy of western democracy and the "End of But not all leftist presidents were the same. Some embraced a radical version of populism, best exemplified by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, while others adopted a more moderate approach blending traditional leftist concerns for social justice with free market economic policies as exemplified by Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva in Brazil. Yet despite their many differences, Chavez and Lula shared one fundamental characteristic -both deliberately set out to challenge, or if possible, replace U.S. hegemony in Latin America. Sean Burgess wrote in 2007 that "Brazil and Venezuela are engaged in a contest for leadership of South America, each offering a different vision of how the regional geopolitical, geo-economic, and ideological space should be organized and directed." 6 This paper will explore the similarities and differences in the rise and trajectory of these two distinctly different "Lefts" in Latin America by examining Venezuela under Chavez and Brazil under Lula. The framework for this analysis will begin by defining radical populism and the moderate left. Next, each leader will be analyzed in turn by examining their rise to power, their social and economic policies, and the foreign policy trajectories they have undertaken. Finally, implications for U.S.
policy in response to the regional leadership of Venezuela and Brazil will be given.
Throughout the analysis this paper will seek to answer the following questions. Which of these models is most politically and economically sustainable and why? Which offers the best hope of prosperity and stability for its citizens? More importantly, will Brazil or Venezuela emerge as the regional leader of Latin America and if so, what are the implications for U.S. foreign policy?
Radical Populism and the Moderate Left Defined
In beginning to understand these two lefts it is useful to examine the underlying political models they are founded upon. Although there is a general consensus that Venezuela's Hugo Chavez is a populist, political scientists and international relations theorists disagree on the exact term that best describes his unique form of populism.
"Hybrid Regime," "Contestatory Left," "Neo-populism" and "Radical Populism" have all been used to describe Chavez's political style. 7 An in-depth exploration of the nuanced differences between these various labels is outside the scope of this paper. For our purposes a general definition of populism and a focus on the Venezuelan model in particular will suffice. In Latin America, populism is associated with a charismatic leader who unites previously marginalized socio-economic or labor groups with promises of jobs and social benefits and then mobilizes them to form a political power base. 8 Sebastian Edwards explains that, When defining populism, political theorists and historians usually refer to political movements led by individuals with strong and charismatic personalities whose attractiveness to the masses stems from a fiery rhetoric that centers on the causes and solutions to inequality. Their discourse pitches the interests of "the people" against those of the oligarchy, corporations, financial capital, the business sector and foreign companies. 9 Chavez's version of populism, or Chavismo, is a modernized version which adds some unique aspects. Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold identified three additional traits of Chavismo; "a militaristic bent, state oriented economic policies, and a distinctive foreign policy that is committed to balancing the influence of the United States and exporting its radical political ideology across the region." 10 Another defining characteristic of Chavismo is how it deals with internal and external conflict. Chavez has embraced polarization as a powerful political tool for dealing with domestic and international conflict. Francisco Panizza explains that, "After starting his government as a moderate "Third Way" reformer, Chavez radicalized his positions and progressively expanded the political dividing line between himself and his enemies with attacks against neoliberalism and US imperialism that… came to represent not just his political enemies, but the enemies of the Venezuelan people." 11 In other words, Chavez successfully cast himself as the defender of the Venezuelan people. Internationally, Chavez sought to cast himself as the champion and defender of the left in Latin
America, but with only mixed results.
In contrast to radical populism, the moderate left, as exemplified by Lula in Brazil, seeks to reform existing institutions rather than replacing them and strives for accommodation with its rivals in lieu of polarization. Under Lula's leadership, Brazil has adopted a modernized social democratic model. Social justice and economic redistribution remain core tenets of social democracy, 12 but as Brands notes, modern
Latin American social democrats "now combine their traditional emphasis on social justice with responsible macroeconomic policies, respect for democratic procedures, and an aversion to polarizing practices and rhetoric." 13 In contrast to Chavez's personalistic form of regional leadership and efforts to spread his "twenty-first century socialism," Lula has sought to establish and expand Brazil's leadership both in Latin
America and internationally as an emerging nation. Lula's goal was not to export a political model, but to secure markets and sustain Brazilian economic growth.
Hugo Chavez in Venezuela
In 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez of the Venezuelan Army attempted to seize the presidency by force. He failed and spent the next two years in prison.
However, his one-minute television address to the nation --a precondition of his surrender to government forces --made him a national celebrity. 14 Six years after his failed coup attempt Chavez won the presidency with 56 percent of the vote. 15 However, Chavez didn't win as an experienced political activist at the head of traditional party.
Instead, he won as a political outsider riding a wave of voter discontent and apathy twenty years in the making. 16 As Gregory Wilpert vividly describes, Real per capita income suffered a massive and steady decline over a period of twenty years, from 1979 to 1999, declining by as much as 27% in this period. No other economy in South America experienced such a dramatic fall. Along with this drop, poverty increased, from 17% in 1980 to 65% in 1996… Eventually not enough resources were available to maintain the clientelistic-corporatistic political culture, which then dealt a deadly blow to the two main political parties and enabled the rise and election a political outsider. Loyalty to the system had essentially been bought with hard cash rather than earned through political persuasion, so when the money ran out, so did the loyalty. Chavez undermined the autonomy of the country's Supreme Court by expanding its membership from 20 to 32 and packing the new seats with his supporters. 24 The
December 2005 National Assembly (Venezuela's legislative body) elections eliminated one of the last remaining checks on presidential power; when the opposition boycotted the elections in a bid to trigger international condemnation, Chavez was handed 100%
control of the legislature. 25 As one author notes, "Following the 2005 election, Venezuela's National Assembly became a mere rubberstamp of presidential bills, rather than a bargaining actor." 26 Chavez also sought to curtail the power and influence of other political actors in Venezuela. He purged opposition military officers and appointed "Chavista" officers without Congressional approval thereby eliminating the potential for dissent and expanding his political control over the military. Chavez also purged career diplomats and replaced them with political appointees. 27 This move eliminated another potential forum for dissent and reasserted Chavez's control over diplomacy and foreign policy.
Perhaps most importantly for Chavez's consolidation of presidential power and the future implementation of his social programs, he transformed the national oil company from an autonomous but state owned industry to an organization firmly under presidential control. Javier Corrales explains, He illegally fired key board members of the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, which produced a widespread labor and business strike, prompting Chavez to fire an additional twenty thousand staff, completely eroding the autonomy of the fattest milk cow in the entire country and the most profitable of Latin America's state-owned enterprises.
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The importance of this move in allowing Chavez the means to perpetuate himself in power is hard to understate. Venezuela is a petro-state; oil accounts for 95% of exports and 55% of government revenue. 29 Since gaining office in 1999, Chavez has consistently sought to consolidate political power in the office of the president and undermine his political opposition. He has used oil revenues, political maneuvering and above all polarization in order to replace liberal democracy with his vision of "twenty-first-century socialism." Javier Corrales observed that, Politically, the Chavez regime changed Venezuela from a system in which incumbent and large opposition forces shared the spoils of office into a system of reduced political sharing… mostly because the executive branch has concentrated power, eroded the autonomy of checks and balances, reduced press freedoms, imposed costs on actors situated in the opposition…. 31 Corrales concludes that Chavez has in fact implemented a political revolution in In his generally sympathetic analysis of Chavez's twenty-first-century socialism, Gregory Wilpert identifies three characteristics that represent a break from previous governments. First he cites "a tremendous increase" in social spending on redistributive programs such as free education and health care, subsidized food and housing, and rural and urban land reform. 42 Next he notes that Chavez bypassed existing government institutions and created new organizations -his "missiones" or missions concept -to implement his social programs. Lastly, Chavez enlisted local communities in the "missions" process. As Wilpert explains, "This citizen participation has proved to contribute significantly to mobilizing the population both in defense of the social programs and in defense of the government…" 43 A critical analysis of these three "revolutionary" aspects of Chavez's social policy identifies two outcomes that help explain why Chavez chooses to fund them. First his redistributive programs, while they may help alleviate some pressure of poverty, are not formulated to eradicate it. These policies create dependencies on government handouts and subsidies rather than creating development. However, they do generate an effect that the last two characteristics share; they create a pool of "clients" who receive benefits from the state and in return they are expected to support the state (Chavez) with their votes.
Creating parallel state institutions (the missions) and enlisting local committees also helped to create a vast new pool of clients. This is not to argue that Chavez has not helped the poor -he has; the question is to what end. As Corrales and Penfold note, Although some programs were influenced by poverty considerations, most programs were used to buy votes at the municipal level. As a consequence, clientelism and poverty spending interacted closely. In fact, in the act of distributing cash, the Chavez regime was able to simultaneously "buy votes" while distributing oil income to the very poor. 44 The net benefit to Chavez is perpetuation in office. The effect on Venezuelan democracy is decidedly negative; the mechanism for presidential transitions has been suppressed. As Corrales and Penfold conclude,
The key point is that a combination of opportunistic social spending and declining accountability has decisive political effects: on the one hand, it fosters clientelism; on the other it perhaps leads to an administration that is virtually impossible to defeat electorally. The opposition can never match the level of resources deployed by the state… Spending has given the Chavez regime an advantage in competing for votes: his government competes with words and money, the opposition, with words only. 45 Chavez has built a vast system of patronage based on creating "clients" that support him politically in return for government jobs and social programs funded by Venezuela's oil wealth. He has also successfully subverted democracy at home by eliminating, suppressing or co-opting other political actors (the military, legislature and judiciary), Under Chavez, Venezuela changed direction. Vis-á-vis the United States, Venezuela became the most uncooperative country in the region after Cuba and a strident critic of almost every U.S foreign policy initiative. Vis-á-vis other Latin American countries, Caracas started to emphasize close ties with social movements and political leaders seeking "revolutionary" change, rather than political conciliation and gradual reforms… the level of tension and decline of cooperation in U.S.-Venezuela relations are without precedent. 47 Beyond simply resisting U.S. hegemony, Chavez has sought to actively oppose U.S.
interests -by implementing "soft balancing."
Corrales and Penfold define soft balancing as "efforts by nations to frustrate the foreign policy objectives of other, presumably more powerful nations, but stopping short A hybrid regime [Chavez's government] operating on a continent with so many democracies faces a particular foreign policy challenge: being ostracized and admonished by neighboring states. This situation compels the hybrid regime to make an extra effort to neutralize potential sources of criticism and even win over neighbors as allies. One way to do this is to give lavish foreign aid. Precisely because Latin America is predominantly democratic, Chavez must invest heavily in efforts to inhibit expressions of concern and to preempt rebukes coming from these countries with gifts. Moreover, to effectively buy the silence or non-censure of social progressives abroad, this foreign aid must adopt the veneer of progressive values. 56 Thus Chavez operates in a cycle of influence peddling; he relies on political polarization and fiery rhetoric to motivate his political base and espouse his socialist revolution, but in order to deflect criticism (and create the perception of support) Chavez has to fund foreign aid programs and finance leftist politicians abroad. Lula's own actions best define his interpretation of the moderate left. From the beginning of his presidency, Lula charted a course nearly opposite that of Chavez. As will be described in greater detail in the sections that follow, Lula has developed three defining characteristics of the moderate left: reform over revolution, gradual improvement instead of radical change and multilateralism over ideology. In both domestic and foreign policies, Lula has consistently sought reform over revolutionary change -improve existing structures and organizations instead of replacing them. Lula has consistently chosen gradual improvement over rapid, radical change. And finally, Lula has sought not to export an ideology, but rather to promote multilateralism on the world stage and South American integration at home -both of which seek to create space for the growth of Brazilian markets and the expansion of trading partners. How then has Lula implemented these principals in his political, economic and social policies?
One insight into Lula's political policies as president can be gleaned from the manner in which he achieved office. Unlike Chavez, the one-time coup leader, Lula da Silva has shown a steadfast commitment to the democratic "rules of the game."
Francisco Panizza noted that, "In contrast to the Venezuelan president's progressive political radicalization, Lula da Silva has travelled an opposite path, from radicalism to moderation." 62 In this Lula reflected the personality of his party. Panizza concludes that "The PT was never a revolutionary party, and its radical rhetoric was always tempered with a respect for the democratic rules of the game and a considerable dose of pragmatism." 63 So when looking backwards it comes as no surprise to find that Lula continued to work within the existing political and party system despite very close electoral defeats in 1989 and 1994. 64 Also not surprising is the fact that Lula carried this respect for democracy forward with him into office.
Perhaps most important is what the literature does not say about Lula. The research conducted for this paper did not identify a single instance of Lula seeking to modify the structure of the Brazilian government to expand presidential power, extend presidential term limits or change the constitution to perpetuate himself in power. Lula's most definitive commitment to democracy came in January 2011 when he passed the office of the presidency to fellow PT party candidate Dilma Rousseff. 65 A defining characteristic of the moderate left is working within the existing framework of democracy instead of seeking a radical change in government structure and the balance of power.
It is also a key political difference between Lula and Chavez; Lula worked for change within the existing system, while Chavez sought to replace the existing system with one more to his liking. What then of Lula's economic and social policies? Did Lula seize control of the sources of government revenue to fund his social programs as Chavez did in Venezuela?
Rather than seeking to implement radical change and a dismantling of Brazilian capitalism, Lula once again sought moderation and incremental improvement to existing policies and structures. Sebastian Edwards sums it up when he writes that, "President Lula surprised pundits and experts of all stripes by strictly avoiding the populist temptation. During his tenure Brazil has shown strict respect for property rights and as a result has attracted large volumes of direct foreign investment." 66 Kingstone and Ponce similarly noted that, Lula's success is not a reflection of a sharp break with the past and an inversion of priorities. Instead he benefited from an unusually positive international economy until 2008, and by maintaining continuity with the policies and policy orientations of his predecessor… 67 Kingstone and Ponce go on to cite three tenets of Lula's economic orientation:
monetary stability, flexibility in seeking market reform and a commitment to address poverty and inequality. 68 They further noted that, These policies have helped Brazil achieve stability, modest growth, and a steady, gradualist commitment to addressing historic injustices. Some might argue that this is not a spectacular achievement, and there is no question that it leaves many important issues unresolved. But it is a considerable achievement given Brazil's turbulent history, and it lays the groundwork for continued gradual improvement. Edwards cites a recent World Bank study:
The virtue of Bolsa Família is that it reaches a significant portion of Brazilian society that has never benefited from social programs. It is among the world's best targeted programs, because it reaches those who really need it. Ninety-four percent of the funds reach the poorest 40 percent of the population. Studies prove that most of the money is used to buy food, school supplies, and clothes for the children. 76 Beyond improving the functionality of the transfer programs, Lula also greatly increased their scope. Participation in the Bolsa Família program ballooned from 3.6 million in 2003 to over 11 million by 2006. 77 The program also generated soft power benefits for Brazil; similar programs have been implemented in Mexico, Colombia, Honduras and Nicaragua. 78 However, Lula's social policies were not popular with all of segments of the PT party. Many party loyalists thought Lula's programs did not go far enough; some criticized Bolsa Família as a handout program with one PT deputy going as far as saying, "We didn't struggle for two decades in the opposition for this!" 79 Despite resistance from more radical elements within the PT, Lula's macroeconomic approach did bear fruit. Sebastian Edwards noted that,
In spite of criticism from his own supporters who wanted to favor income distribution over price stability and growth, Lula persevered… With inflation under control and reduced overall economic instability, consumer credit soared, and for the first time in a generation the lower middle class and the poor had widespread access to white goods, vacations and automobiles and, perhaps more important, could obtain mortgages and become homeowners. Lula's willingness to sacrifice honesty for political expediency also generated criticism. Unlike Chavez who was willing to completely undermine democracy to achieve his goals, Lula was only willing to bend it a little -or at least look the other while his supporters did the dirty work. Kingstone and Ponce observe that,
The radical left undermines existing institutions and democratic procedures to advance its political and economic program. By contrast, the moderate left is more oriented to negotiation with the opposition and is willing to make concessions to preserve the institutional and procedural aspects of democratic governance. 84 As discussed above, Chavez used Venezuela's vast oil wealth to create new forms of patronage and to in effect buy votes at the local level while subordinating the other branches of government to the presidency. Lula's supporters implemented a more targeted approach. They bypassed the electorate and went beyond concessions to the opposition to gain supporters for his policies. Instead of modifying the system, Lula's supporters simply began paying opposition congressmen a monthly payment of approximately $12,000 USD in return for their votes. 85 The ensuing scandal rocked Iranian support in its quest to secure a permanent Security Council seat. 99 The independent geopolitical analysis company STRATFOR posited independence from the U.S. as a possible motive when it wrote, Many Brazilians have no idea why the government is engaging abroad when it has no threats to face. But in its attempt to engage all comersfrom the United States and Israel to Venezuela and Iran -Brazil acquires a reputation of neutrality by showing that it does not intend to subordinate its interests to those of the States. The revival of radical populism poses two principal challenges for U.S. policymakers. The first pertains to prospects for democratic stability and sustainable economic development in the region. The second has to do with hemispheric security and diplomatic cooperation and the overall tenor of U.S.-Latin American affairs.
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As shown previously, Chavez has undermined Venezuelan democracy by eliminating governmental checks and balances (through co-opting or suppressing other political actors), consolidating extraordinary presidential power and eliminating term limits. He has also chosen dependency over economic development by creating a patronage network funded by oil revenues. These actions run counter to the U.S. goals of supporting and spreading democracy but in the end, the Venezuelan electorate determines under which form of government the country lives.
Chavez's efforts to expand his influence and impede U.S. policy objectives across the region are more troublesome. He has created a loose anti-American alliance centered on the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) nations: Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. Together, these nations have undermined U.S. regional counter-drug, security and free trade goals, at least within their respective nations.
Russell Crandall echoes the idealist viewpoint when he writes,
No one should underestimate the capacity of the Venezuela-led block of quasi-authoritarian leftist governments to stop the regional trend toward greater openness and democracy -values the block sees representing a capitulation to the U.S.-controlled global system. 104 However, there is a growing consensus that Chavez has passed the apogee of his regional appeal. As early as 2007, Chavez's abrasive rhetoric and aggressive style had eroded his popularity. In a regional opinion poll conducted that year Chavez earned the dubious distinction of being one of the most "widely mistrusted" world leaders. 105 Another author cited a Brazilian official who confided that, "the first thing that Brazil and a number of other countries try to do at inter-American meetings is marginalize the Venezuelan representative. 106 While the ALBA nations will likely continue to at least nominally support Chavez and oppose U.S. regional goals, few other nations seek to join them. Corrales and Penfold note that, …social-power diplomacy has not led to a realization of Chavez's grandiose visions for a paradigm shift in Latin America. It has not given rise to a massive coalition of Latin American nations against the United States… Few Latin American politicians now running for office want to be openly associated with Chavez.
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Chavez and his ALBA allies may be able to frustrate, or at least impede, U.S. regional goals on certain issues but the problem is manageable; U.S. policymakers and diplomats can negotiate these challenges in the future as they have over the last decade.
Political realists take a much narrower view of the challenge Chavez poses for the U.S. In their assessment, Venezuela is only important in terms of oil and oil is "the sole reason Venezuela has risen to the level of being geopolitically important." 108 Nevertheless, a potential long-term concern for U.S. policymakers is the fact that Venezuela's oil production is in decline. Francisco Rodriguez notes that, "Production has been steadily declining since the government consolidated its control of the industry in late 2004. According to OPEC statistics, Venezuela currently produces only threequarters of its quota of 3.3 million barrels a day." 113 Yet the critical future issue for U.S.
policymakers is not an intentional disruption in Venezuelan oil exports or a decreasing production, instead they should worry about Venezuela's internal stability.
Chavez has built an empire based on oil revenues and his personal leadership.
The loss or prolonged interruption of either would dramatically undermine Venezuelan stability. On the oil front, Chavez faces decreasing oil revenues due to falling prices and declining production. The loss of revenue is destabilizing for a populist government reliant on oil money to keep its project afloat. As STRATFOR observes, Despite government officials' avowals, it is only a matter of time before Caracas will have to start cutting back on social spending and raising taxes. This means hardship for Venezuelans who rely on the government to sustain subsidies and run national companies -and hardships for Venezuelans could mean destabilizing unrest for the country as a whole. In the longer term, the U.S. faces a different challenge; how to reincorporate post-Chavez Venezuela into the political and security framework of the region.
Reestablishing relations and rebuilding trust will take many years. Chavez has carefully crafted and nurtured political polarization and anti-Americanism in Venezuelan politics and society over the last thirteen years and those sentiments will not be quickly The United States faces a very different set of policy challenges regarding Brazil.
In contrast to Venezuela's declining influence, Brazil is gaining recognition as the new leader of Latin America. 119 As Riordan Roett notes, Under President Lula's leadership, Brazil has become the most significant regional actor in South America-a voice for moderation and integration. At the international level, Brazil is now a respected player and interlocutor with both the emerging-market countries and the industrialized states.
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Brazil's emergence as a regional leader and growing economic power presents the U.S.
with a dilemma; it is at once an important supporter of U.S. regional goals and a challenge to U.S. regional influence.
Brazil shares the United States' enduring national interests of security,
prosperity, values and international order, although Brasilia does of course have its own perspective on how to pursue those interests. Although not perfect, Brazil is a stable, successful democracy and a strong supporter of regional stability. As Hal Brands notes, On numerous issues-international trade and finance, energy, environmental issues, Security Council reform-Lula has focused less on undermining the existing order than on increasing Brazil's stake in that order. This strategy has at times led to conflict with the United States… On the whole though, Lula's desire to make Brazil a strong, responsible international stakeholder-as well as Brazil's long land borders, which give Brasilia an immense interest in preserving regional stability-have pushed him toward a foreign policy that, while strongly independent, is largely compatible with U.S. interests.
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Lula's pursuit of Brazilian interests has created friction with the U.S. in some specific areas like trade; nevertheless, overall cooperation has increased. As one author noted, "Despite occasional bilateral tensions, the United States and Brazil are cooperating more than ever before in areas including military relations, counternarcotics, energy, and the environment." 122 And as described in a previous section, Brazil is willing to work within the existing international order while seeking reforms to make current structures more equitable for emerging economies. Yet despite the challenges of competition, Brazil is not an economic or ideological threat to the United States -in fact, Brazil is potentially a key future ally.
Nonetheless, Brazil still has hurdles to overcome in its new role as a regional leader. Foremost may be the backlash from its regional neighbors -as one Latin
American diplomat quipped, "…the new imperialists have arrived, and they speak It is natural that these large and complex countries with such different global positions and different domestic political exigencies will not see eye to eye on every question. But is should be a concern of high priority to negotiate and compromise on matters on which the interests of the two countries are compatible.
Nevertheless, much work remains to be done to transform the goal of a robust U.S.-Brazilian partnership into a reality. As the United States enters an era of fiscal constraints and reordered priorities, partnering with Brazil may become more challenging while simultaneously becoming more important to achieving U.S. regional goals.
Conclusion
The election of Hugo Chavez to the presidency of Venezuela in 1998 heralded a new shift to the left in regional politics and generated a competition for the leadership of Brazil's emergence as a regional and international power also presents challenges for the United States. It will not be easy for the U.S. to relinquish its historic role as the hegemonic power broker in Latin America. However, Brazil's new leadership role in the region will benefit the U.S. if policymakers and diplomats nurture and mentor
Brazil as an emerging regional partner instead of an emerging rival. Brazil shares America's interests in democracy, stability and security. Both parties have vested interests in working together to minimize the negative influences of Chavez and his supporters. Likewise, crafting a regional response -political, economic and military -to a collapse of law and order in Venezuela is another potential area of future bilateral cooperation. Although the U.S. and Brazil will not agree on every issue, each side will reap the benefits of cooperation on issues of shared interest.
